















Infertility currently affects over 6 million individuals in the United States.  While most health 
insurance plans nationwide do not cover infertility diagnoses or treatments, to date fifteen states 
have enacted some form of infertility insurance mandate.  In this paper, I use data from the Vital 
Statistics Detail Natality Data and Census population estimates to examine whether these state-
level mandates were successful in increasing fertility rates.  Using a difference-in-differences 
approach, I exploit variation in the enactment of mandates both across states and over time, and 
identify control groups that should not have been affected by infertility coverage.  My results 
suggest that the mandates significantly increase first birth rates for women over 35, and these 
results are robust to a number of specification tests.   
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I.  Introduction 
The American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has defined infertility to be a 
disease of the reproductive system.  Like other diseases, it imposes significant costs on women 
and families.  The psychological effects of infertility have been compared to the effects of other 
diseases such as cancer and heart disease (e.g. Fidler and Bernstein, 1999), and the financial 
costs of treatment can be quite large.  These costs are currently borne by a large number of 
individuals, as infertility affects over 6 million individuals, and one in ten couples cannot 
conceive without medical assistance.  However, only 25 percent of all health plan sponsors 
provide coverage for infertility services.   
The ASRM has stated, “The desire to have children and be parents is one of the most 
fundamental aspects of being human.  People should not be denied insurance coverage for 
medically appropriate treatment to fulfill this goal.”
1  In response to a perceived need for 
coverage, legislation was introduced at the federal level in 2003 that would require health plans 
to provide infertility benefits.
2  As the fraction of the population affected by infertility continues 
to rise, there are likely to be continued efforts to mandate coverage.  Understanding the costs and 
benefits of these policies thus becomes increasingly important.   
As of 2003, fifteen states have enacted some form of infertility insurance mandate.  I use 
Vital Statistics Detail Natality Data and Census population estimates to examine whether these 
state-level mandates were successful in increasing fertility rates.  Using a difference-in-
differences approach, I exploit variation in the enactment of mandates both across states and over 
time, and identify control groups that should not have been affected by infertility coverage.  My 
                                                 
1 www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.htm 
2 The Family Building Act of 2003 (HR 3014) would require insurance coverage of infertility treatment (including 
up to four in vitro fertilization (IVF) attempts) by all group health plans that also require obstetrical benefits.    
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results suggest that the mandates significantly increase first birth rates for women over 35, and 
these results are robust to a number of specification tests.   
  II.  Background Information 
A.  Incidence of Infertility/Impaired Fecundity 
    There are a variety of problems associated with defining infertility as well as with 
obtaining standardized measures of its incidence that can be followed over time.  Demographers 
using the National Survey of Family Growth have used two criteria to classify whether women 
are having difficulties in childbearing.  Infertility only applies to married or cohabiting women, 
and is defined as the condition of being unable to conceive after 12 or more consecutive months 
of unprotected intercourse.  Impaired fecundity, however, applies to women of any marital or 
cohabiting status, and is defined as having problems with conceiving or carrying a pregnancy to 
term, as well as being unable to conceive after 3 years of unprotected intercourse (Chandra and 
Stephen, 1998).
3,4   
  Overall, the proportion of women reporting impaired fecundity has risen only 2 
percentage points between 1982 and 1995, from 8% to 10%.  However, due to increasing 
numbers of women between the ages of 15-44, there has actually been a dramatic increase in the 
number of women reporting infecundity, from 4.6 million to 6.2 million.
5  This increase has 
occurred across almost all subgroups of women, including along the dimensions of marital 
status, income, education, race, and ethnicity (Chandra and Stephen, 1998).  The one dimension 
on which fertility-impaired women differ from the general population of women is age -- 43% 
are aged 35-44, as compared with 36% of the general population (Stephen and Chandra, 2000) 
                                                 
3 Both conditions only apply to those women who are not surgically sterile. 
4 However, the ASRM does not, in official documents, make this distinction.   
5 One reason given for this increase is delay of childbearing to later ages that are associated with decreased fertility.  
Another possibility is that an increase in attention paid to infertility by the media may have increased women’s 
awareness of potential fertility problems, leading to an increase in self-reports.      
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Treatments for infertility can be extremely expensive.  Most instances of impaired 
fecundity are treated by “conventional” methods such as drug treatment or surgical repair of 
reproductive organs.  Some of the less invasive therapies such as hormone therapy can range 
from $200-$3,000 per cycle. Tubal surgery can range from $10,000-$15,000, requires a hospital 
stay and poses a high risk of complication (Resolve, 2003).  In vitro fertilization (IVF) accounts 
for approximately five percent of all infertility treatments, and the average cost of an IVF cycle 
in the United States is $12,400 (ASRM, 2003). 
  Despite the large and growing share of the population that faces infertility problems, and 
despite the large financial costs of treatment, health care coverage of treatment is limited.  
Nationwide, only 25% of health care plans cover infertility treatment, and coverage varies 
significantly by state.
6  Of the 6.2 million women with impaired fecundity in 1995, 2.7 million 
(44%) had ever sought treatment.  Of that group, 700,000 women had sought treatment within 
the past year.  However, as a result of the high (and often uninsured) costs associated with 
treatment, medical assistance for infertility is sought primarily by women and couples that are 
white, college-educated, and affluent.  Women with private health insurance coverage were 50% 
more likely to have received services, as were women with income more than 300% of the 
poverty line (Stephen and Chandra, 2000).  This is the case even though increases in infertility 
over time have occurred across all race, ethnicity, income, and education groups (see Chandra 
and Stephen (1998) and Stephen and Chandra (2000)).  It is widely believed that there is an 
unmet need for infertility services, especially among those with lower incomes and lower levels 
of education (Chandra & Mosher 1994). 
                                                 
6 As a comparison, in 2002 78% of covered workers had coverage for oral contraceptives (Kaiser Foundation, 2002), 
and a study of health plans found that 57% covered colonoscopy (Klabunde et al., 2004).      
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B.  State Mandates 
The first state-level infertility insurance mandate was enacted by West Virginia in 1977.  
Since that time, fourteen other states have passed mandates, and additional states have ongoing 
legislative advocacy efforts in this area.  Of the traditional economic justifications for mandated 
benefits (e.g. Summers, 1989; Gruber, 1994)),  the best efficiency argument is that asymmetric 
information between the patient and insurer will lead to an adverse selection problem so that 
benefits will not be provided by the private market (e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976).
  
In addition, two externality arguments can be made for mandated infertility coverage.  
Both deal with multiple births, which are costly to society and are generally paid for by higher 
health insurance premiums for everyone.  First, if fertility drugs and IVF are substitutes, and if 
cheaper fertility drugs increase the incidence of multiple births, then subsidizing IVF might 
reduce the number of multiple births.  Second, since IVF is so expensive, if a couple chooses to 
undergo this treatment and bears the full cost, there is a great deal of pressure for a successful 
cycle.  This could lead to more embryos being transplanted per cycle, which increases the 
probability of multiple births.  Studies (Jain et al. (2002), Reynolds et al. (2003), and Hamilton 
and McManus (2005)) find evidence that the presence of an IVF mandate reduces the number of 
embryos transplanted per cycle. 
The mandates that have been passed vary along several dimensions.  A mandate “to 
cover” requires that health insurance companies provide coverage of infertility treatment as a 
benefit included in every policy.  A mandate “to offer” requires that health insurance companies 
make available for purchase a policy which offers coverage of infertility treatment.  In addition, 
some mandates cover all health plans, while others either exclude health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) or only cover HMOs.  Finally some mandates exclude coverage of IVF,    
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which is one of the most expensive treatments available for infertility.  Table 1 provides a list of 
the states with mandates currently in place, the date the mandates were enacted, whether the 
provisions are mandates to offer or mandates to cover, whether the mandates cover IVF, and how 
the mandates treat HMOs.  Detailed information on these mandates, including any further 
restrictions placed on coverage, can be found in Appendix A.
7  As of 2000, these mandates were 
in place in only thirteen states.  However, as is illustrated in Table 2, these mandates affect an 
increasing share of the population over time.  In 1985, less than one percent of all live births in 
the US occurred in mandate states.  By 1990, 30% of births were in mandate states, and this 
percentage rose to 46% by 1995.     
By reducing the price of infertility treatment, we might expect to see an increase in 
utilization of treatments.  This could be true if the mandate expands access to individuals who 
previously could not afford treatment, or if individuals who were previously receiving treatment 
now choose to consume higher quantities (or a higher quality) of treatment.  However, it is also 
possible that these mandates have no effect on access or on treatment consumed, but simply 
provide windfall gains to those individuals who would have purchased treatment in the absence 
of insurance coverage.  Finally, mandates may also have dynamic effects on the timing of births.  
Individuals could seek treatment earlier, which is beneficial from a medical perspective.  
Alternatively, individuals could further delay childbearing, with the knowledge that they will 
ultimately be covered.   
To date only a few studies have looked at the effects of these mandates.  Jain et al. (2002) 
and Reynolds et al. (2003) use clinic data from 1998 and find that states with required coverage 
for IVF have the highest rates of IVF utilization. Hamilton and McManus (2005) develop a 
                                                 
7 Many mandates restrict treatment to individuals on the basis of marital status.  In addition, several states also 
restrict treatment on the basis of age.      
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model of the market for IVF and use data from clinics at the Metropolitan Statistical Area level 
to test the model’s predictions.  Using data from 1995-2000, they confirm the findings of Jain et 
al. (2002) and Reynolds et al. (2003) that a mandate increases IVF utilization rates.  They also 
find that clinics are attracted to areas where women are more educated and wealthier, but find no 
evidence that clinics are attracted to places where mandates are in effect.  While these studies are 
an important contribution to our understanding of the effects of these mandates, they have 
several shortcomings.  First, they focus exclusively on IVF, even though IVF comprises only 
about 5% of all infertility treatments.  In addition, the studies are cross-sectional and cannot 
control for unobservable differences in patients or clinics that may be state-specific.  It is 
therefore impossible to tell if, for example, higher rates of utilization in Massachusetts are caused 
by the mandate, or if Massachusetts had higher rates of utilization prior to the mandate.   
Two additional studies exploit both state-level variation and variation over time to look at 
the effects of the mandates.  Buckles (2005) uses Vital Statistics Detail Natality Data and finds 
that mandates that cover IVF are associated with a higher age at first birth.
8  Bitler (2005) uses 
the mandates to examine the effects of assisted reproductive technologies on infant health 
outcomes.  She finds small negative effects of these technologies on length of gestation, birth 
weight, and Apgar scores.   
In this paper, I use a difference-in-differences approach where I exploit variation in the 
enactment of mandates both across states and over time to determine whether these mandates 
have been successful in increasing first birth rates.  By analyzing birth rates rather than IVF 
utilization, I can estimate the total effects of the mandates on fertility, which will include 
increases resulting from all types of infertility treatments.   
III. Data  
                                                 
8 Buckles also looks at impacts of the mandates on economic variables such as labor force participation and wages.     
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Information on births comes from Vital Statistics Detail Natality Data, gathered by the 
National Center for Health Statistics.  This information is based on birth certificate data, and 
includes specific information about the timing, parity (whether it was a first or subsequent birth), 
and plurality (whether it was a single, twin, triplet, or higher order birth) of each birth.  These 
data also include demographic information on the mother, including age, race, ethnicity, marital 
status, and educational attainment.  Geographic information about the mother's state of residence 
is also provided.  Beginning in 1985 the data cover every birth in the United States.  The counts 
of births by state, year, race, and five-year age cohort are used to generate birth rates.
9   
The denominators for birth rates must come from another data source, since the birth 
certificates only provide information on those women who actually give birth.  Population 
estimates are available for black and non-black women by age and state through the Census 
Bureau, and can be used to calculate birth rates.  Ideally, the denominator would include only 
those women who have not yet had a first birth.  However, the Census data do not allow for 
further breakouts.  Birth counts by parity of the mother can be calculated, but denominators with 
counts of women by the number of children they have already borne cannot be generated.  Other 
control variables, collected by state and by year, come from a variety of publicly available 
sources.  Summary statistics for the data set, which covers the years 1985-1999, can be found in 
Appendix B.
10   
IV.  Model Specification 
I estimate the following model: 
                                                 
9 Five year cohorts are used up to the age of 49 (15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49).  The maximum 
age reported by the Vital Statistics Data was 49 through 1996, and in 1997 births to women up to the age of 54 were 
also reported.  I omit births to women 50 and older to maintain consistency across years.   
10 The last mandate passed during this sample period was Ohio, in 1991.  All results are robust to analyzing the 
shorter period of years from 1985-1993.      
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where the dependent variable is the log first birth rate for age cohort a in state j and year t.
11  The 
first birth rate is equal to the number of first births within an age cohort-race-state-year cell, 
divided by the number of women in that same age cohort-race-state-year cell.  I focus on first 
birth rates, because treatments are more likely to be sought by women who have not already 
borne children.   
The independent variable of primary interest, Mand, is an indicator for whether a state 
had an infertility insurance mandate in place in a given year.    In the specification, a mandate is 
not allowed to affect fertility rates in the year it is enacted, but can instead affect fertility rates 
with a two year lag.  This is to account for two factors: 1) infertility treatments often do not result 
in an immediate conception; and 2) even if a conception occurs immediately, there is still a 
necessary nine-month waiting period before those new conceptions can affect fertility rates.
12  If 
the mandates have been successful at increasing access to infertility treatments, and if these 
treatments have been successful, then the estimated coefficient on this variable is expected to be 
positive.   
                                                 
11 Other papers examining fertility often use the log birth rate as the dependent variable (for example, see Klerman 
(1999), and Dee (2001)), despite an ongoing debate in the literature about whether this practice is appropriate (e.g. 
Manning and Mullahy (2001).  One specific concern with the log specification used here is the presence of some age 
cohort-race-state-year cells with zero births.  In the main regression results presented here, I set zero cells to an 
arbitrarily small number before taking logs.  However, I have run two tests to check the sensitivity of my results.  I 
first eliminate the oldest cohort, where most of the zero cells occur.  Results are qualitatively similar, but slightly 
smaller in magnitude.  Second, I employ a technique developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) that explicitly 
accounts for both the fractional nature of the dependent variable and the presence of zero values.  Again, results are 
similar in magnitude and statistical significance to those presented here.   
12 If a one-year lag structure is used, results are qualitatively similar but the magnitude of the estimated coefficients 
is slightly smaller.        
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However, it is possible that there exist systematic differences in first birth rates across 
states that are correlated with, but not caused by the state-level mandates.  If this unobserved 
heterogeneity exists, one way to estimate the effects of the mandates accurately is to identify a 
treatment group for whom the mandates should have a direct effect, and a control group for 
whom they should not.  This approach allows for estimation of the parameter of interest without 
bias.  To this end, I use age cohort as a way of distinguishing a treatment group and a control 
group.  The probability that a woman experiences infertility is extremely low for young women, 
and increases with age.  Those women most likely to be affected by the mandates are those who 
have delayed childbearing, and specifically those women 35 and older.
13  As such, I interact the 
mandate with an identifier for whether the birth rates are for age cohorts 35 and older.  The 
estimated coefficient γ  will pick up any unobserved heterogeneity in birth rates that is correlated 
with the state mandates.  The effect of the mandates on the treatment group of older women,θ , 
will then be estimated without bias.   
One potential concern with this approach is the possibility that women under 35 may be a 
contaminated control group.   This could happen for two reasons that would affect my results in 
opposing directions.  First, younger women might also be receiving infertility treatments.  
Alternatively, it is possible that younger women may be more likely to delay childbearing if they 
know infertility treatment is covered by their insurance.  An alternative way to think of the 
methodological approach is to interpret γ  as the estimated effect of the mandates on all women, 
and θ  as the additional effect on older women.  The estimate of γ would be positive if the first 
effect dominated, and negative if the second effect was larger.  As another robustness check, I 
                                                 
13 The American Society for Reproductive Medicine identifies 35 as an important turning point in the risk of 
infertility problems.  Their Patient’s Fact Sheet on the Prediction of Fertility Potential in Older Female Patients 
states that “approximately one-third of couples in which the female partner is age 35 or older will have problems 
with fertility.”        
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estimate all regressions omitting the portion of the control group most likely to be receiving 
infertility treatment – women 30-34.  All results are robust to this alternate specification.   
The Z vector controls for variables that will vary across states and over time that might 
also affect birth rates.  These include variables that reflect economic conditions, including the 
state unemployment rate, log median usual weekly earnings, log tenth percentile weekly usual 
earnings, and female labor force participation rates.
14  A variable describing whether parental 
involvement is required for minors to obtain an abortion is also included.
15  The Z vector also 
includes the log maximum level of state welfare benefits available to a family of three.
16  The 
specification also includes state fixed effects (Sj) to control for any time-invariant unobserved 
state characteristics that may influence age-specific birth rates, year fixed effects (Tt) to control 
for national trends in birth rates over time, and age fixed effects (Aa), as well as a complete set of 
age-year interactions to allow for differential trends in birth rates by age over time.
17  The error 
term is represented by ε.  Difference-in-differences estimation can lead to artificially low 
standard error estimates if the outcomes and the policy changes of interest are serially correlated 
(Bertrand et al., 2002).  I calculate White robust standard errors clustered by state to correct for 
this potential problem. Regressions are weighted by the population counts in each cell. 
 
V.  Results 
A.  Main Results 
                                                 
14 Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) find that parental characteristics vary systematically depending on the 
unemployment rate at the time of a baby’s conception.   
15 Fertility regressions also often include restrictions on Medicaid funding of abortions.  I do not control for these 
policies here, since few states changed these policies over my sample period (see Levine, 2002).   
16 These values are for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program through 1996, and for the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families program from 1997 through 1999.   
17 First birth rates for older women have been increasing over time, as an increasing number of women delay their 
first births until older ages.  The mean age at first birth for women in the United States has risen from 21.4 years in 
1970 to almost 25 years in 2000 (Mathews and Hamilton, 2002).    
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  Results from the estimation of equation (1) can be found in Column 1 of Table 3.
18  First 
birth rates vary significantly by age in a nonlinear fashion.  Compared to the omitted category of 
women age 15-19, women in their early twenties are most likely to have a first birth.  After age 
25, first birth rates decline with age.  State level welfare generosity and parental involvement 
restrictions on abortion have no significant effects on births.
19 
Having a mandate in effect in a state has no significant effect on birth rates.  The 
estimated coefficient is –0.05 and is not statistically different from zero.  However, the presence 
of a mandate does significantly increase birth rates for women over 35.  The estimated 
coefficient implies that the presence of a mandate increases birth rates for women over 35 by 
32%, and this effect is statistically significant at the five-percent level.  In 1999, Vital Statistics 
Detail Natality data report 104,455 first births to women over the age of 35 (with a first birth rate 
for this group of 0.0034).  A 32% increase would imply an additional 34,787 births to this group 
of women.
20  As an additional sensitivity test, I re-estimate the specification in Column 1 with 
additional controls for state-specific linear time trends.  These do not change the magnitude nor 
the statistical significance of the mandate variables, suggesting that once age-year interactions 
are added, there are no additional state-specific trends over time that are correlated with the 
mandates. 
One argument for expanding coverage made by proponents of mandates is that there are 
currently large differences in access to treatment.  White, married women with high levels of 
income are most likely to seek and to receive treatment for infertility (e.g. Stephen and Chandra, 
2000).  While I cannot test for effects by marital status or income with these data, I can test 
                                                 
18 The results in Table 3 are similar to results in an earlier, preliminary paper (Schmidt, 2005).   
19 Levine (2002) finds that parental involvement laws decrease abortion rates for younger teens but have no 
significant effects on births.   
20 As a comparison, reports from the Center for Disease Control imply that roughly 11,000 live births to women 
over 25 resulted from IVF cycles that began in 1998.  Many of these births would have occurred in 1999.      
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whether the mandates are having differential effects on birth rates by race.  I re-estimate the 
model separately by the race of the mother.  These results, presented in Columns 2 and 3 of 
Table 3, suggest that the effects of the mandates on the full sample are entirely driven by results 
for white women.  There are no significant effects of the mandates on the first birth rates of 
African American women, either for the entire population or for the subgroup of women over 35, 
and the point estimates are much smaller than for white women.   
While Table 3 shows that the mandates have a very large, positive, significant effect on 
first birth rates for women between the ages of 35-49, there is likely to be a great deal of 
heterogeneity within this group.  In particular, demand for infertility services may increase with 
the age of the mother, leading to larger effects of the mandates at older ages.  To test this, I allow 
the effect of the mandates to vary by age cohort.  These results are presented in Table 4.  There 
are no significant effects of the mandates for women under 34.  However, the coefficients on the 
mandate-age interactions are positive and significant for each age group beginning with the 35-
39 year olds, and as would be expected, the effects increase in magnitude and statistical 
significance with age.  The results suggest a 12% increase in first births among women aged 35-
39, and a 32% increase for women 40-49.  Due to the smaller coefficient for women 35-39 (who 
account for most of the births to older women), back-of-the-envelope calculations based on these 
coefficient estimates suggest a smaller effect of the mandates.  These estimated coefficients 
would imply an additional 11,696 births to women 35-39, and an additional 5,659 births to 
women 40-49, or a total effect that is roughly half the magnitude of the impact suggested by 
Table 3.   
B.  Robustness Tests    
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The enactment of state mandates will generally only help those individuals who already 
have access to health insurance.  In Panel A of Table 5, I interact the mandate variables with the 
share of the women 15-44 with private health insurance.
21  The estimated coefficients on the 
control variables in the regression are similar to those presented in Column 1 of Table 3, so only 
the estimates of the mandate coefficients are presented here.  The share of individuals with 
private insurance has a negative and significant effect on birth rates, but this is likely capturing 
omitted variables such as income that are correlated with both the likelihood of having private 
insurance and with fertility.  The mandate interacted with private health insurance has no 
significant effect on first birth rates, but the coefficient on the three-way interaction between the 
presence of a mandate, the share of women with health insurance, and whether or not the age 
group is 35 and older is positive and statistically significant at the five-percent level.   
In addition, even among those firms that provide their employee with health insurance, 
not all are subject to the mandates.  First, the smallest firms are generally exempt from the 
mandates.  Second, under the Employer Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), firms 
that self-insure are exempt from the mandates.  It has been argued that the passage of mandates 
could induce firms to self-insure in order to avoid compliance (e.g. Jensen et al. (1995)).  Ideally, 
I would have information on the share of employees by state and year in firms that self insure.  
However, these data are not available.
22  It has been shown that the primary determinant of self-
insurance by firms is firm size, with large firms being significantly more likely to self-insure 
(Park, 2000).  In panel B of Table 5, I interact the mandate variables with variables that indicate 
                                                 
21 These data come from the March Current Population Survey.   
22 Park (2000) provides data on the share of employees in firms that self-insure by state for 1993.  While there is a 
great deal of variation by state, the average self-insurance rate for the mandate states in 1993 is 47.9%, compared 
with the average self-insurance rate for the non-mandate states of 48.8%.  (These figures exclude Hawaii, which has 
an employer mandate for health insurance coverage that predates ERISA, and is therefore not subject to ERISA 
preemption).        
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the share of women who work (or who have a spouse that work) in firms of a particular size.  
(Categories are less than 25 employees, 25-99 employees, and more than 100 employees.)
23  
While none of the interactions between the firm size variables and the mandate variables are 
statistically different from zero, the point estimates suggest that all of the action on mandates for 
women over the age of 35 is in the mid-size firms (this coefficient is extremely large and is close 
to achieving statistical significance at the 10 percent level), which is consistent with employees 
in both the smallest and the largest firms having less access.  The total effect of the mandates 
(summing the coefficients across firm size) is still zero for the overall population, and is still 
positive and statistically significant for women over the age of 35.   
In Panel C of Table 5, I allow mandates covering all health plans to affect births 
differently than mandates that either exclude HMOs or that only cover HMOs, by replacing the 
dummy variable for mandate with the share of the population that is covered by the mandate.  
For states with no mandate, this variable is equal to zero; for states with a mandate covering all 
health plans, it is equal to one; for states with mandates only covering HMOs, it is equal to the 
HMO penetration rate; and for states with mandates excluding HMOs, and it is equal to one 
minus the HMO penetration rate.
24  The main results presented above are robust to this alternate 
specification.  The share of the population covered by the mandate has no significant effect on 
overall first birth rates, but has a positive and significant effect for women over 35.   
It is also possible that the effect of the mandates on first birth rates varies depending on 
the type of mandate enacted.  In particular, one might expect a “mandate to cover” to affect 
births differently than a “mandate to offer”, or a mandate that includes IVF to affect births 
differently than one that excludes IVF.  In Table 6, I break out the mandates by type.  Column 1 
                                                 
23 These data are generated from the March Current Population Survey.  
24 HMO penetration rates come from Interstudy, various years.      
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presents the main results from Table 3.  Column 2 shows results from a specification separating 
mandates to cover from mandates to offer.  The estimated coefficient on the mandate to cover 
variables implies a 34 percent increase in first birth rates for women over the age of 35, 
statistically significant at the five-percent level.  The point estimate on the mandate to offer 
variable for women over 35 is slightly smaller, at 0.29, and is not statistically different from zero.  
However, these coefficients are not statistically different from each other.     
In Column 3, I break out mandates that cover IVF versus those that exclude IVF.  These 
results are surprising, in that mandates in those states that exclude IVF coverage have a much 
larger effect on first birth rates than mandates in states that cover IVF.  However, the states that 
exclude IVF are California, Montana, New York, Ohio, and West Virginia.  One might expect 
that this group, dominated in population by California and New York, is not a representative 
group of states.  In the next three columns, I test to see whether these results are primarily driven 
by the two large states.  Column 4 presents results which omit California from the sample, while 
Column 5 presents results omitting New York.  Column 6 presents results that omit both states.  
The effect of mandates to cover remains fairly stable at approximately a 15-16 percent increase 
across these specifications (although this effect is not precisely estimated).  However, omitting 
California and New York from the sample completely removes any estimated effect of the 
mandates that exclude IVF, suggesting that the results in Column 3 are completely driven by 
these large states.   
  As a final robustness check, I re-estimate the model using log second and higher parity 
birth rates as the dependent variable.  If infertility treatments are more likely to be sought by 
women who have not already given birth, the effects of mandates on higher parity birth rates 
should be smaller.  Results in Table 7 confirm this.  The estimated coefficient on mandates for    
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women over 35 falls from 0.32 for first birth rates to 0.20 for second and higher birth rates, and 
is no longer statistically different from zero.   
VI.  Conclusion 
For a woman or couple faced with fertility problems, a conception and birth is the 
ultimate goal.  From this perspective, it appears as if the state-level infertility insurance mandates 
have been a success, as I find that the mandates significantly increase first birth rates among 
women over 35.   The estimated effects increase with age, and are robust to a wide variety of 
specification tests.  Despite the rhetoric of increased access that has surrounded the enactment of 
mandates, the mandates have had no effect on the first birth rates of African American women.   
  As demographic changes and continued trends in delay of childbearing cause infertility to 
become an increasingly common medical problem, advocacy groups are likely to continue to 
pressure policymakers to enact mandated benefits at both the state and federal levels.  Insurance 
providers are likely to continue to resist these pressures.  A full evaluation of the effects of these 
mandated benefits is essential to informing this policy debate.     
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Table 1 











Arkansas 1987*  Cover  Yes  HMOs  excluded 
California 1989*  Offer  No  All  plans  covered 
Connecticut 1989  Offer  Yes  HMOs  excluded 
Hawaii 1987  Cover Yes  All  plans  covered 
Illinois 1991  Cover Yes  All  plans  covered 
Louisiana 2001  Cover  No  All  plans  covered 
Maryland 1985  Cover  Yes  All  plans  covered 
Massachusetts 1987  Cover  Yes  All  plans  covered 
Montana 1987  Cover  No  HMOs  only 
New Jersey  2001  Cover  Yes  All plans covered 
New York  1990*  Cover  No  HMOs excluded 
Ohio 1991  Cover  No  HMOs  only 
Rhode Island  1989  Cover  Yes  All plans covered 
Texas 1987 Offer Yes  All  plans  covered 
West Virginia  1977*  Cover  No  HMOs only 
Sources: Resolve (www.resolve.org) and state laws (see Appendix A).  *Arkansas, California, 
New York, and West Virginia first passed mandates in the years shown.  These mandates were 
subsequently revised, but remained in place.      
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Table 2 





1985 1990 1995 
Live births in mandate states   25,259  1,258,990  1,782,930 
     
Live births in US 
 
3,765,064 4,162,917 3,903,012 
Births in mandate states as a 
percentage of total births 
0.67% 30.24%  45.68% 
     
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics of the United States, Volume I 
(Natality), various years.  Births are considered to be in mandate states if a mandate was in place 
in the previous calendar year.      
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Table 3 
Effects of Mandates on First Birth Rates 
 















        
Black -0.0862 
(0.0376) 
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Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the first birth rate in a state-year-race-age cohort cell.  All regressions 
include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a full set of age-year interactions.  White robust standard errors 
clustered by state in parentheses.  Regressions are weighted by cell-level population counts.  Levels of statistical 
significance: *** denotes significance at the one-percent level; ** at the five-percent level; and * at the ten-percent 




Age Specific Mandate Effects 
 
    
Mandate * Under 30   -0.0785 
(0.0899) 
 
Mandate * Age 30-34  0.0165 
(0.0641) 
 
Mandate * Age 35-39  0.1274 
(0.0541) 
** 
Mandate * Age 40-49  0.3230 
(0.1034) 
*** 
    
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the first birth rate in a state-year-race-age cohort cell.  All regressions 
include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a full set of age-year interactions.  White robust standard errors 
clustered by state in parentheses.  Regressions are weighted by cell-level population counts.  Levels of statistical 
significance: *** denotes significance at the one-percent level; ** at the five-percent level; and * at the ten-percent 
level    
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Table 5 
Effects of Mandates on First Birth Rates, Sensitivity Analyses 
 
    
A.  Private Health Insurance  
Mandate * share with private health insurance  -0.0524 
(0.0908) 
 
Mandate * share with private health insurance * 35Plus  0.4417 
(0.1906) 
** 
Share with private health insurance   -0.8077 
(0.2470) 
*** 
    
B.  Firm Size    
Mandate * share in firms with less than 24 emp  0.4317 
(0.8278) 
 
Mandate * share in firms with less than 24 emp * 35Plus  -0.0299 
(2.0263) 
 
Mandate * share in firms with 25-99 emp  -1.2948 
(2.1493) 
 
Mandate * share in firms with 25-99 * 35Plus  6.3961 
(3.9634) 
 
Mandate * share in firms with 100+ emp  -0.0065 
(0.2319) 
 
Mandate * share in firms with 100+ emp * 35Plus  -0.5895 
(0.4102) 
 
    
Share in firms with less than 24 emp  -0.5130 
(0.1913) 
*** 
Share in firms with 25-99 emp  -0.1698 
(0.2970) 
 
Share in firms with 100+ emp  -0.5888 
(0.1637) 
*** 
    
Test if  sum of (Mandate * firm size * 35Plus) interactions = 0      
F(1, 31959)   8.06  *** 
    
Test if  sum of (Mandate * firm size) interactions = 0      
F(1, 31959)   0.52   
    
C.  Share of population covered by mandate (due to variation in treatment of HMOs) 
Share covered by mandate  -0.2421 
(0.2134) 
 
Share covered by mandate * Plus35  0.5590 
(0.2251) 
** 
HMO penetration rate  0.3992 
(0.2823) 
 
    
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the first birth rate in a state-year-race-age cohort cell.  White robust standard 
errors clustered by state in parentheses.  Regressions include state and year fixed effects, as well as age*year 
interactions.  Regressions are weighted by cell-level population counts.  Levels of statistical significance: *** 













CA & NY) 
Mandate * 35Plus  0.3160 
(0.1426) 
**  --    --  --  --  --  
                
Mandate to cover * 35Plus  --    0.3428 
(0.1454) 
**  --  --  --  --  
Mandate to offer * 35Plus  --    0.2881 
(0.2420) 
  --  --  --  --  
                
Mandate covers IVF * 
35Plus 









Mandate excludes IVF * 
35Plus 









                
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the first birth rate in a state-year-race-age cohort cell.  White robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.  
Regressions include state and year fixed effects, as well as age*year interactions.  Regressions are weighted by cell-level population counts.  Levels of statistical 
significance: *** denotes significance at the one-percent level; ** at the five-percent level; and * at the ten-percent level. 
Table 7 
Second and Higher Birth Rates as dependent variable  
 




Mandate * Plus35  0.1999 
(0.1278) 
 
    
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the higher order birth rate (second births and higher) in a state-year-race-age 
cohort cell.  All regressions include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a full set of age-year interactions.  
White robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.  Regressions are weighted by cell-level population 
counts.  Levels of statistical significance: *** denotes significance at the one-percent level; ** at the five-percent 








The current law, enacted in 1991, requires all insurance policies which provide pregnancy-
related benefits to provide coverage for in vitro fertilization.  To qualify: 
 
•  The patient must be the policyholder or the spouse of the policyholder and must be a 
covered dependent under that policy.   
•  The patient must have her oocytes fertilized by her spouse’s sperm. 
•  The patient and her spouse must have a history of unexplained infertility for at least two 
years, or must have one or more of the following medical conditions: 
1.  Endometriosis 
2.  Exposure in utero to Diethylstillbestrol (DES) 
3.  Blockage or removal of one or both fallopian tubes, not as a result of voluntary 
sterilization. 
4.  Abnormal male factors. 
•  The patient must have been unable to obtain successful pregnancy through other less 
costly infertility treatments for which coverage is available under the policy. 
•  The in vitro procedure must be performed at a medical facility licensed by the Arkansas 
Department of Health and meeting the standards set by either the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists or the American Fertility Society 
 
These qualifications indicate that the woman must be married to receive coverage; however, no 
other restrictions exist regarding the age of the patient, the maximum firm size that may omit 
coverage, or exceptions for religious organizations.   
 
The law has existed in this form since 1991, but some coverage for in vitro fertilization was first 
required of health insurance companies in 1987.  The 1991 law revised the 1987 one by setting 
maximum and minimum benefit levels and establishing the above standards for determining 






California’s 1989 law mandates that all insurers covering hospital, medical or surgical expenses 
on a group basis offer coverage of infertility treatment, excluding in vitro fertilization.  Infertility 
is defined as either the presence of a demonstrated medical condition recognized by a licensed 
physician, or as the inability to conceive a pregnancy or carry a pregnancy to term after at least a 
year of regular unprotected sexual intercourse.  Covered treatment includes diagnosis, 
medication, surgery, and gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT).  No restrictions exist as to the 
age or marital status of the patient, or the size of the firm or group offering the policy.  Religious 
organizations whose religious or ethical principles disagree with this policy are exempt from 
having to offer coverage.      
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According to 1989 law, all group insurers must offer an insurance plan that covers the 
“medically necessary” expenses of the diagnosis and treatment of infertility, including in vitro 
fertilization procedures.  “Infertility” is defined as the inability to conceive or to retain a 
pregnancy during a one year period.  “Medically necessary” is not defined, nor are there any 
other restrictions or exemptions.   





In 1987, Hawaii passed a law requiring all individual and group health insurance policies which 
provide pregnancy-related benefits to provide a one-time only benefit for all outpatient expenses 
arising from in vitro fertilization.  To qualify: 
 
•  The patient must be the policyholder or the spouse of the policyholder and must be a 
covered dependent under that policy.   
•  The patient must have her oocytes fertilized by her spouse’s sperm, where “spouse” is 
defined as the person who is lawfully married to the patient under the laws of the state. 
•  The patient and her spouse must have a history of unexplained infertility for at least five 
years, or must have one or more of the following medical conditions: 
1.  Endometriosis 
2.  Exposure in utero to Diethylstillbestrol (DES) 
3.  Blockage or removal of one or both fallopian tubes, not as a result of voluntary 
sterilization. 
4.  Abnormal male factors. 
•  The patient must have been unable to obtain successful pregnancy through other less 
costly infertility treatments for which coverage is available under the policy. 
•  The in vitro procedure must be performed at a medical facility meeting the standards set 
by either the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists or the American 
Fertility Society. 
 
No restrictions exist for age of the patient or firm size, and no exemptions are made for religious 
organizations. 





Illinois law requires that all group insurers providing coverage for more than 25 employees after 
1991 must cover the diagnosis and treatment of infertility, including in vitro fertilization, uterine    
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embryo lavage, embryo transfer, artificial insemination, gamete intrafallopian tube transfer, 
zygote intrafallopian tube transfer, and low ovum tube transfer.  To qualify: 
 
•  The patient must be unable to conceive or sustain a pregnancy after one year of 
unprotected sexual intercourse. 
•  The patient must be unable to obtain successful pregnancy through other less costly 
infertility treatments for which coverage is available under the policy. 
•  The patient must have undergone fewer than four oocyte retrievals, unless a live birth has 
resulted from a completed oocyte retrieval, in which case she is entitled to two more 
covered retrievals. 
•  The procedure must be performed at a medical facility meeting the standards set by either 
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists or the American Fertility 
Society. 
 
No other restrictions exist; however, the insurer does not have to pay for: 
 
•  The reversal of voluntary sterilization. 
•  Costs rendered to a surrogate for purposes of childbirth 
•  The cryopreservation and storage of sperm, eggs, and embryos. 
•  Non-medical costs of a sperm or egg donor, including travel costs. 
•  Experimental treatments. 
 
Furthermore, religious organizations which find these policies to be at odds with their moral and 






As of 1985, Maryland requires that insurers of individuals and groups, including HMO’s,  must 
provide coverage of in vitro fertilization to the same extent as pregnancy-related services are 
provided.  To qualify: 
 
•  The patient must be the policyholder or the spouse of the policyholder and must be a 
covered dependent under that policy.   
•  The patient must have her oocytes fertilized by her spouse’s sperm. 
•  The patient and her spouse must have a history of unexplained infertility for at least two 
years, or must have one or more of the following medical conditions: 
1.  Endometriosis 
2.  Exposure in utero to Diethylstillbestrol (DES) 
3.  Blockage or removal of one or both fallopian tubes, not as a result of voluntary 
sterilization. 
4.  Abnormal male factors. 
•  The patient must have been unable to obtain successful pregnancy through other less 
costly infertility treatments for which coverage is available under the policy.    
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•  The in vitro procedure must be performed at a medical facility meeting the standards set 
by either the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists or the American 
Fertility Society. 
 
Benefits may not exceed a maximum lifetime benefit of $100,100.  Women must be married, but 
no further restrictions apply.  Religious organizations are exempt from providing coverage if it 
conflicts with their moral beliefs.  Firms with 50 or fewer employees are also exempt as of 1994. 





1987 Massachusetts law requires all insurers and HMO’s to cover benefits for required infertility 
procedures, including artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, 
sperm or egg procurement, processing, and storage, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, and zygote 
intrafallopian transfer.  The insurer must also cover prescription drugs relating to infertility.  
Insurers are not required to cover experimental procedures, surrogacy, reversal of voluntary 
sterilization, or cryopreservation of eggs.  Patients must hold the insurance policy themselves, or 
must be the spouse or dependent of the insured person.  Infertility is defined as the inability to 
conceive or carry a pregnancy to term during the period of one year.  No other requirements or 
exemptions apply. 





Montana’s laws require HMO’s to cover infertility treatment, but specifically excludes artificial 
insemination and infertility treatment from coverage mandated for other insurance companies.  
No mention is made of what infertility is, nor what is covered by the HMO’s.  No other 
requirements or exemptions apply. 





New Jersey’s law was not enacted until 2001.  However, it mandates that all insurers covering 
groups of 50 or more must cover the diagnosis and treatment of infertility.  This includes 
artificial insemination, assisted hatching, diagnostic tests, fresh and frozen embryo transfer, up to 
four completed egg retrievals, GIFT and ZIFT, in vitro fertilization, medications, ovulation 
induction, and surgery.  Insurers do not have to pay for reversal of voluntary sterilization, 
surrogacy cryopreservation of eggs, sperm, or embryos, non-medical costs of the egg or sperm 
donor, experimental treatments, or ovulation or sperm testing kits.  They also do not have to pay 
for IVF, GIFT, or ZIFT for women who are 46 years of age or older.  Employers with religious 
objections are exempt from offering coverage.  A patient is considered infertile if she a) is under 
age 35 and is unable to conceive after two years of unprotected sexual intercourse; b)is over age 
35 and is unable to conceive after one year of unprotected sexual intercourse; or c) is medically    
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sterile.  Patients must use all reasonable, less expensive treatments before turning to IVF, GIFT, 
or ZIFT, and all such procedures must be performed in a medical facility meeting the standards 
set by either the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists or the American Fertility 
Society.  No other requirements or exemptions apply. 





As of 1990, group insurers in New York are required to provide coverage of infertility 
treatments, including diagnostic tests and pharmaceuticals, for all infertile women between ages 
21 and 44 who have been covered under the policy for at least a year.  Insurers are not required 
to cover in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian transfer, 
reversal of voluntary sterilization, sex change procedures, cloning, or experimental procedures.  
“Infertility” must be determined in accordance with the standards of the American College of 
Obstetrics and Gynecologists and the American Society for Reproductive Medicine.  No other 
requirements or exemptions apply.   
 
In 2002 the state of NY passed a revised law, which clarified the 1990 law and appropriated $10 
million to a pilot project to help pay for in vitro procedures for a small number of people who 
received care from those facilities that were to be the beneficiaries of grants awarded through the 
program. 
 





Under a 1991 law, Ohio includes coverage for infertility services as part of its basic health care 
services, and, as such, covers the medically necessary diagnosis and correction of problems 
causing infertility.  There is no specific law covering in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian 
transfer, or zygote intrafallopian transfer; however, the Superintendent of Insurance stated in 
1997 that IVF, GIFT and ZIFT were not essential for the protection of an individual’s health and 
were therefore not subject to mandated insurance coverage.  Ohio has no definition of infertility, 






Rhode Island (1989) requires that all insurers which cover pregnancy-related benefits also cover 
the diagnosis and treatment of infertility, where “infertility” is defined as “the condition of an 
otherwise healthy married individual who is unable to conceive or produce conception during a 
period of one year.”  It further stipulates that the patient co-payment may not exceed 20%.  There 
are no other requirements or exemptions. 






1987 Texas law requires group and private insurers to offer coverage for outpatient expenses 
arising from in vitro fertilization procedures.  To qualify: 
 
•  The patient must be the policyholder or the spouse of the policyholder and must be a 
covered dependent under that policy.   
•  The patient must have her oocytes fertilized by her spouse’s sperm. 
•  The patient and her spouse must have a history of unexplained infertility for at least five 
years, or must have one or more of the following medical conditions: 
1.  Endometriosis 
2.  Exposure in utero to Diethylstillbestrol (DES) 
3.  Blockage or removal of one or both fallopian tubes, not as a result of voluntary 
sterilization. 
4.  Abnormal male factors. 
•  The patient must have been unable to obtain successful pregnancy through other less 
costly infertility treatments for which coverage is available under the policy. 
•  The in vitro procedure must be performed at a medical facility that meets the standards 
set by either the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists or the American 
Fertility Society 
 
Religious organizations whose moral code conflicts with this policy are exempt from offering 
coverage.  No other restrictions or exemptions exist. 





Since 1977, West Virginia has required HMO’s to cover infertility services as part of “Basic 
Health Care Services.”  The 1977 law did not specify which services were covered, which 
women were covered, or whether any organizations were exempt from providing coverage.  That 
1977 law was amended in 2001, and mandated HMO’s to cover infertility treatment only as a 
“preventative service” benefit (thus excluding in vitro fertilization). 
(West Virginia Code §33-25A-2).   
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First birth rate  0.0231 
(0.0240) 
Log median weekly earnings  5.9156 
(0.1399) 
Log 10
th percentile weekly earnings  4.7808 
(0.1922) 
Unemployment rate  5.7129 
(1.7799) 
Female labor force participation  rate  59.274 
(4.739) 
Maximum AFDC/TANF  benefit  460.184 
(180.274) 
Parental involvement abortion restrictions  0.4706 
 
Share with private health insurance  0.6591 
(0.2006) 
Share in firms with less than 25 emp  0.1315 
(0.1122) 
Share in firms with 25-99 emp  0.0758 
(0.0711) 
Share in firms with 100+ emp  0.3834 
(0.2093) 
HMO penetration rate  0.1388 
(0.1241) 
  
Number of state-year-age-race cells  32130 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.  Observations are state/year/5-year age cohort/race 
cells.   
 
 